WORLD LAW
CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: ADVISORY OPINION
Charter is the
THE first purpose expounded by the United Nations
1

maintenance of international peace and security. In recent years,
however, the increasing expense of United Nations peace-keeping
operations in the Suez and Congo areas has caused the organization
serious financial difficulties. 2 The problem stems from the failure of
several members to pay their apportioned shares of the costs.8 These
nations, most notably the Soviet Union, have contended that the
Suez and Congo activities were not undertaken in conformity with
the Charter, and consequently, members of the United Nations are
not bound by the resulting obligations.
In an effort to resolve the dispute, the General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of
Justice." On July 20, 1962, the Court issued such an opinion, 5
stating that the Suez and Congo expenses were "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning of the Charter.
The Court first considered *article 17 (2) of the Charter, which
provides: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." It had been
contended that the phrase "expenses of the Organization" should be
construed to encompass only "regular" or "administrative" expenses.
Such an interpretation would render the General Assemblypowerless
to apportion the Suez and Congo expenditures, since these allegedly
were of an irregular or non-administrative nature. In rejecting this
argument, the court followed traditional methods of statutory construction. The express use of the word "administrative" in a subse1

U.N. CHARTu art. 1, para. 1.
'In an attempt to finance these operations, the General Assembly has authorized
the issuance of $200,000,000.00 in bonds.

U.N. GEN. Ass. REs. No. 1739 (XVI) (1961).

3 Over 50% of the U.N. members are in arrears in their contributions to the Suez
and Congo operations. U.N. SECRETARIAT, STATEMENT ON THE COLLECTION OF CoNrTRmuTIONS AS AT 22 FEBRUARY 1963 (ST/ADM/SERE/170) (1963).

'Advisory Opinions are obtained pursuant to U.N. CHARTer art. 96; STAT. INT'L CT.
Jusr. art. 65. Such opinions are not binding upon U.N. members.
5Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151.
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paragraph 6 was

quent
held indicative of the drafters' intent not to so
limit article 17 (2). The Court concluded that the phrase "expenses
of the Organization" refers to all expenses incurred by the United
Nations in the furtherance of purposes enunciated in its Charter.
Because the Suez and Congo operations were conducted pursuant to
Charter purposes, that is, the maintenance of international peace
and security,7 the costs were apportionable by the General Assembly.
The actual practice of the United Nations was found to be consistent
with this view, since from 1947 through 1959, the General Assembly
had made provision for peace-keeping activities in the same manner
as for other expenses.
The Soviet Union also claimed that the Suez and Congo expenditures were not "expenses of the Organization," inasmuch as they were
not dealt with exclusively by the Security Council. Since the General Assembly's power was allegedly limited to discussing, studying,
and recommending, the Soviets argued that it could not impose an
obligation to pay the expenses resulting from the implementation of
its recommendations. In analyzing this contention, the court construed relevant provisions of the Charter" as giving the Security
Council primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security. The Charter was found to have
conclusively demonstrated that the General Assembly was also to be
concerned with such matters.9 In essence, the Court concluded that,
absent specific restrictions, the General Assembly could exercise
peace-keeping powers equivalent to those of the United Nations
as a whole. In the present case the only relevant restriction was
article 11 (2), which provides that when "action" is necessary the
General Assembly must refer the question to the Security Council.
In this context, the majority interpreted "action" to mean coercive
or enforcement action. 10 On the other hand, the Suez and Congo
operations were set up with the consent of the nations concerned
and involved solely peace-keeping functions. Therefore, the-Court
concluded that the operations did not constitute enforcement action
prohibited by article 11 (2).
8

U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 3.

'U.N.
8 U.N.

CHARTER
CHARTER

art. 2.
arts. 24, 43.

arts. 10, 14.
[1962] I.C.J. REP. at 164. Enforcement action is action with respect to threats

910U.N. CHARTER

to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. U.N. CHARTm Ch. VII.
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The Court's broad interpretation of the functions and powers
of the General Assembly represents a highly significant development
in international law. In effect, legal sanction has been given to a shift
of responsibility for maintenance of peace from the Security Council
to the General Assembly.11
Unfortunately, the opinion was rendered in an advisory capacity
and will not have the binding effect of domestic judgments. Even
though the General Assembly has accepted the majority decision,1 2
total compliance by delinquent members is not assured. Conceivably, a member two full years in arrears could lose its vote
under article 19, but it is not clear whether this provision is selfexecuting or requires a majority or two-thirds vote. The opinion
will be of immense practical value, however, in influencing the
attitudes toward payment and perhaps the votes of United Nations
members.
" This view is in accordance with the principles of the Uniting for Peace Resolution,
whereby the General Assembly may take steps to preserve the peace when the Security
Council fails to act. U.N. GEtN. Ass. R. No. 877A (V) (1950).
U.N. GE. Ass. Rxs. No. 1854 (XVI) (1962).

